Our conversation this week broached the topic of the AIDS situation in Africa, but some had to leave early. So a quick recap:
There is a general consensus among a group of scholars that met at the university that contraceptives—-condoms--would dramatically improve the AIDS situation in Africa. The question was asked whether, if they are in fact correct, the Church could admit of circumstances that permit their use.
I posed a thought experiment, but I don't know where it leads. A couple situations:
America has the death penalty, and it is appropriate to say that the Church opposes it in our circumstances. Allowed now are means that are quick, effective, and relatively painless. But say we come to reintroduce other means that are slow, agonizing, and torturous, like drawing and quartering. Can the Church coherently maintain that the death penalty is in all circumstances wrong, but that drawing and quartering is worse? Or would lethal injection somehow be implicitly condoned if the Church said drawing and quartering were worse? Or would the Church simply continue to oppose the death sentence in general?
Perhaps another helpful example is abortion.
America allows abortion and the Church opposes it in all its forms. Most forms are legal right now, but, if I'm not mistaken, partial-birth is not. When that law was passed (illegalizing partial-birth abortion), could Catholics support it on the ground of its particularly heinous character? Could it in any way be called “worse” than a “normal” abortion? Or would any such support rather be based on other grounds, such as a numbers argument (i.e. any law that reduces the number of abortions, regardless of the kind, is good)?
Neither of these actually get at the root of the AIDS situation, however, because it fundamentally involves more than one party. I heard it phrased this way once:
Contracting AIDS is a death-sentence. If a woman has a promiscuous husband who contracts the disease extra-maritally, she has the right to defend herself from his (equivalent of an) attempt on her life. She can ask that they not have sex at all, but what if he is insistent or even forceful? While still rape, she would seem to have more influence over her attacker than in other rape cases; would she be right to insist that he wear a condom? I'll attempt an answer in a bit.
What to make of these cases. Well, if, again, the data is correct, there is still the tricky business of the principle that one may never do evil that good may come of it (which the Church affirms). Only the last of the examples begins to capture this, because the first two are merely tolerating a lesser evil to avoid a greater one (which the Church finds morally permissible). Since the teaching is that contraception is wrong in all circumstances, one would have to actively choose something evil to not spread AIDS (an ostensible good), but that does not seem to be morally permissible.
However, there is a difference between the man and the woman in the last case. The man, in forcing himself on the woman, clearly would be acting immorally whether he wore the condom or not. In either case, he is choosing an evil: rape on the one hand or contraceptive intercourse (mediately) on the other. The woman, however, has a different experience of the situation. If she's a good Catholic, she wants neither contraceptive sex nor AIDS. But if her choice is truly either/or, she would be tolerating a lesser evil (engaging in contraceptive sex) over a greater one (exposing herself to the threat of AIDS) if she chose to ask for a condom. Certainly the man is the sinner. But it would seem to be morally permissible for the woman, forced to choose between two evils, to insist on the condom.
I keep saying it, but IF the consensus is correct, the question comes to my mind whether some slight revision might be made to the teaching regarding contraception's intrinsically immoral character. Based on the sacramental character of the marriage bond, I do not expect the Church to allow married people to use contraception; contraceptive acts would not be in line with the self-giving character of the bond (as JPII argues in his theological phenomenology). But those acts that take place outside marriage do not have this character. Quite the opposite, in fact; many who engage in extra-marital relations are well aware that they have no intention of giving themselves to the other person. Phenomenologically, then, it would seem to be more consistent (while still morally impermissible) for such persons to reflect this lack of self-giving in their physical expression as well. I might even go so far as to say that it would be better (more responsible? less ethically reprehensible?), given a true either/or between contraceptive extra-marital sex and non-contraceptive extra-marital sex, to choose the former. If one were to question the intrinsically immoral character of contraception, that would be how I would do it.
But now to address that big IF. There is certainly a scholarly consensus, as Marina pointed out last Tuesday, that goes against Church teaching. The question is whether this consensus is based on ideology or in the raw data. I have read a few articles (including http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/03/002-aids-and-the-churches-getting-the-story-right-27 ) that argue that the consensus is primarily ideological (they are admittedly conservative sources, but the raw data they report can certainly be checked). Because the researchers have a “Western” conception of sexual liberty, they take for granted the inviolable right to multiple partners and the irreformability of individuals' behavior. On that ground, condoms are the only tool left. But the data cited in the articles I read indicates that not only did behavior change in many countries, but that all countries that showed decreased levels of AIDS also had lower reports of multiple partners. The record for condoms was more mixed. One country (Cameroon), according to these reports, reported increased condom sales from 6 to 15 million with a concurrent (1992-2001) HIV increase from 3 to 9 percent (http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/african_aids_the_facts_that_demolish_the_myths/ ). So the effectiveness of condoms, it seems, can be questioned. Certainly it would be too hasty to accuse the pope of living in an “alternate universe” (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/2008890215_editb20pope.html ), but in some sense the author of that column is right; to seek after Christ and live as he asks does alter one's perception of the world around us. This is not necessarily a bad thing.
Such questioning of prevalent paradigms may be the role that a Catholic has to take in these concrete circumstances: to seek, as Fr. Tom said yesterday at mass, divine knowledge regardless of what others in places of authority might claim to be true. We must follow the Truth, which includes the data, but also the person of Christ. And sometimes, like Galileo, one finds oneself standing with Truth against what other people are saying is Christ and his Church. Discernment is required, and the task of the Christian scientist cannot be dictated to them by these principles alone. Simply seek Truth and take the Magisterium seriously.
I think that's all I have to say on that right now. It's interesting to me that most of my posts this year have ended up discussing contraception. Hm.
Monday, April 26, 2010
Saturday, November 21, 2009
Jumping ahead to morals...
Seeing as I've had some feedback on my most recent post, I thought I would respond to them in a brand new one. It's hard to answer critiques concerning contraception on anything but a case-by-case basis, so I will answer the two questions in the order they were asked.
First, and rather bluntly, is sex for babies, or can it be also or exclusively for pleasure? The Vatican documents say that it is for both (in the following, "union" and "unity" are referring at least in part to pleasure):
Union and Procreation
"This particular doctrine, often expounded by the magisterium of the Church, is based on the inseparable connection, established by God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between the unitive significance and the procreative significance which are both inherent to the marriage act.
"The reason is that the fundamental nature of the marriage act, while uniting husband and wife in the closest intimacy, also renders them capable of generating new life—and this as a result of laws written into the actual nature of man and of woman. And if each of these essential qualities, the unitive and the procreative, is preserved, the use of marriage fully retains its sense of true mutual love and its ordination to the supreme responsibility of parenthood to which man is called."
So, while pleasure is an indissoluble telos/end of the marital act, it is morally impermissible to intentionally separate it from its other telos. The reasoning of this judgment relates more closely to the second question, which will be addressed next. But for this particular question, this gives a preliminary answer. For further evidence, see John Paul II's work in "Love and Responsibility" (the work from which much of the modern position takes its cues) in which he says that is is morally incumbent on the husband to not look only for his own gratification; that is, he is morally required to please his wife. I hope that is helpful in understanding the situation here.
Now, as regards the second question, I'm afraid my own reading of Humanae Vitae (HV) may have gotten in the way. HV does not explicitly deal in terms of "communication" and "conversation." This was my own reading. In this reading's defense, I will briefly try to explain it in those terms, and then switch frameworks for a more thorough discussion.
In my analysis in the previous post, I failed to make explicit something that I had internally and perhaps uncritically assumed: namely, that the uterus is in a particular way the source of God's communication. On further reflection, that is NOT a position that I would like to espouse; it seems a little "fundy" to me. Instead, I'd like to re-define the word 'conversation,' which leads into the more common way of defending HV.
In John Paul II/Karol Wojtyla's work in "Love and Responsibility" (a work that I have not read, admittedly), he takes up sex in a larger framework of human communication. As embodied, intelligent creatures, human beings communicate in many ways: through words, speech, the arts, their bodies. Very much can be communicated in a look, without a word being spoken. Watch "Lie to me" for a television example. It's all about body language, and it has scientific psychological/physiological foundations.
Sex, I think most can agree, is a very - probably the most - intimate form of self-expression and body language. By its nature, it says (or wants to say), "I love you." To be sure, this message can be and often is distorted, but Wojtyla is clear that, at least for Catholics, it is a sacramental act that reflects and reveals Christ's kenotic (self-giving/emptying) love for the Church. The spouses love each other in the way Christ loves his Church. That is: totally, holding nothing back. Thus, for the act to hearken back to its sacramental referent, nothing about it can say "you can have this much of me, but no more."
And this, Wojtyla argues, is precisely what artificial contraception does. It creates a physical and psychological barrier between the spouses, who thereby fail to mirror Christ for one another. It says, "I give myself to you, but I am not willing to bring life into the world with you." It holds back something of crucial importance, both for marriage and for the Christ/Church referent, because both of these are intrinsically life-giving. A married couple, by definition in the Church and at least implicit in their vows, must be open to life. This is so, in turn, because Christ's love for his Church is also fecund; it brings true life to those who believe.
None of this undermines the ability of spouses to make and express their opinions about whether they are meant at a particular time to bring life into the world. But it does require them to be open to the possibility in each and every act; they cannot know for certain that God is not calling them to it.
Finally, there is one other thing in HV that I am almost hesitant to bring up, because I don't want it to shut down the conversation; we NEED to ask these hard questions, so I am thankful for those who have. The document argues that the authority and binding nature of the judgment does NOT lie in any particular or even the overall reasoning of the document. Rather, the document deserves our assent because of the voice that proclaims it. The document, in addressing priests and teachers of moral theology, states:
"For it is your principal duty—We are speaking especially to you who teach moral theology—to spell out clearly and completely the Church's teaching on marriage. In the performance of your ministry you must be the first to give an example of that sincere obedience, inward as well as outward, which is due to the magisterium of the Church. For, as you know, the pastors of the Church enjoy a special light of the Holy Spirit in teaching the truth. (39) And this, rather than the arguments they put forward, is why you are bound to such obedience."
So, even if we find the reasoning behind the document to be flawed in some way, this does not undermine the authority of the magisterium to teach it in a way that calls for our assent. We are - I am - called to come to a deeper and deeper understanding of the teaching, and this requires struggle. But it does not mean that we can reject the doctrine out of hand - not to accuse anyone of having done so.
I hope this was a helpful exposition, though as I said, please feel free to continue asking questions.
First, and rather bluntly, is sex for babies, or can it be also or exclusively for pleasure? The Vatican documents say that it is for both (in the following, "union" and "unity" are referring at least in part to pleasure):
Union and Procreation
"This particular doctrine, often expounded by the magisterium of the Church, is based on the inseparable connection, established by God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between the unitive significance and the procreative significance which are both inherent to the marriage act.
"The reason is that the fundamental nature of the marriage act, while uniting husband and wife in the closest intimacy, also renders them capable of generating new life—and this as a result of laws written into the actual nature of man and of woman. And if each of these essential qualities, the unitive and the procreative, is preserved, the use of marriage fully retains its sense of true mutual love and its ordination to the supreme responsibility of parenthood to which man is called."
So, while pleasure is an indissoluble telos/end of the marital act, it is morally impermissible to intentionally separate it from its other telos. The reasoning of this judgment relates more closely to the second question, which will be addressed next. But for this particular question, this gives a preliminary answer. For further evidence, see John Paul II's work in "Love and Responsibility" (the work from which much of the modern position takes its cues) in which he says that is is morally incumbent on the husband to not look only for his own gratification; that is, he is morally required to please his wife. I hope that is helpful in understanding the situation here.
Now, as regards the second question, I'm afraid my own reading of Humanae Vitae (HV) may have gotten in the way. HV does not explicitly deal in terms of "communication" and "conversation." This was my own reading. In this reading's defense, I will briefly try to explain it in those terms, and then switch frameworks for a more thorough discussion.
In my analysis in the previous post, I failed to make explicit something that I had internally and perhaps uncritically assumed: namely, that the uterus is in a particular way the source of God's communication. On further reflection, that is NOT a position that I would like to espouse; it seems a little "fundy" to me. Instead, I'd like to re-define the word 'conversation,' which leads into the more common way of defending HV.
In John Paul II/Karol Wojtyla's work in "Love and Responsibility" (a work that I have not read, admittedly), he takes up sex in a larger framework of human communication. As embodied, intelligent creatures, human beings communicate in many ways: through words, speech, the arts, their bodies. Very much can be communicated in a look, without a word being spoken. Watch "Lie to me" for a television example. It's all about body language, and it has scientific psychological/physiological foundations.
Sex, I think most can agree, is a very - probably the most - intimate form of self-expression and body language. By its nature, it says (or wants to say), "I love you." To be sure, this message can be and often is distorted, but Wojtyla is clear that, at least for Catholics, it is a sacramental act that reflects and reveals Christ's kenotic (self-giving/emptying) love for the Church. The spouses love each other in the way Christ loves his Church. That is: totally, holding nothing back. Thus, for the act to hearken back to its sacramental referent, nothing about it can say "you can have this much of me, but no more."
And this, Wojtyla argues, is precisely what artificial contraception does. It creates a physical and psychological barrier between the spouses, who thereby fail to mirror Christ for one another. It says, "I give myself to you, but I am not willing to bring life into the world with you." It holds back something of crucial importance, both for marriage and for the Christ/Church referent, because both of these are intrinsically life-giving. A married couple, by definition in the Church and at least implicit in their vows, must be open to life. This is so, in turn, because Christ's love for his Church is also fecund; it brings true life to those who believe.
None of this undermines the ability of spouses to make and express their opinions about whether they are meant at a particular time to bring life into the world. But it does require them to be open to the possibility in each and every act; they cannot know for certain that God is not calling them to it.
Finally, there is one other thing in HV that I am almost hesitant to bring up, because I don't want it to shut down the conversation; we NEED to ask these hard questions, so I am thankful for those who have. The document argues that the authority and binding nature of the judgment does NOT lie in any particular or even the overall reasoning of the document. Rather, the document deserves our assent because of the voice that proclaims it. The document, in addressing priests and teachers of moral theology, states:
"For it is your principal duty—We are speaking especially to you who teach moral theology—to spell out clearly and completely the Church's teaching on marriage. In the performance of your ministry you must be the first to give an example of that sincere obedience, inward as well as outward, which is due to the magisterium of the Church. For, as you know, the pastors of the Church enjoy a special light of the Holy Spirit in teaching the truth. (39) And this, rather than the arguments they put forward, is why you are bound to such obedience."
So, even if we find the reasoning behind the document to be flawed in some way, this does not undermine the authority of the magisterium to teach it in a way that calls for our assent. We are - I am - called to come to a deeper and deeper understanding of the teaching, and this requires struggle. But it does not mean that we can reject the doctrine out of hand - not to accuse anyone of having done so.
I hope this was a helpful exposition, though as I said, please feel free to continue asking questions.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Aliens and Condoms
Sorry to give into the temptation of a provocative title.
After the formal end of our discussion this evening, we hit on a couple interesting, maybe even important, topics. The first of these concerns was brought up by Shane concerning the existence of extraterrestrial life. I, brandishing my twin swords of sci-fi fan-dom and theological interest, have opinions. I have opinions about many things.
The second, on a perhaps more serious note, concerns the status of artificial contraception in the Church, brought up by Brendan. I will address each of these in turn.
First, then, is the issue of aliens; are we alone in the universe? If not, what does that mean theologically? Well with regard to the first question, the Church, to my knowledge, does not make any definitive statements one way or the other. Some might argue that humanity is the unique creation that was made in the image and likeness of God and the only one that God calls "very good," so there can be no other. But I do not find this conclusion to be a necessary position. God has, at least, created other intelligent beings, namely the angels. So in principle, Christianity can tolerate non-human sentient life. And, to quote Jodi Foster, "if it's just us... seems like an awful waste of space." Not that "Contact" hold definitive theological weight. In principle, then, the Church does not definitively rule out the possibility of aliens.
To indulge our imaginations for a moment, then, what happens if there ARE aliens? What happens if we encounter other intelligent, sentient life? What does, or what can, the Church say? I see two possibilities. The first is that the Church would rule that these aliens are not the descendants of Adam, and are therefore not meant to be saved by Christ - a sort of "limited atonement." This position would have support from Scripture in the Adam-Christ typology and from Christological thought in the affirmation of Christ's full "humanity" - note that it's NOT "conscious, sentient, partially material creature." If this position were taken, the Church would effectively rule out evangelization. The Church would say that God has taken to save this other species through a different means than that used for humanity's salvation (and this only assuming that the species was fallen and sinful). If this other species already had a Church or religion with a similar theological structure and with an incarnational God, this would be tricky. Perhaps the Church could make room for the possibility of multiple incarnations - insofar as the domain of these incarnations remains independent and exclusive. That is, both Churches would have to affirm that the Son took the form of their own nature, thus acknowledging that both human flesh and Zorgon exoskeletal-ectoplasm are hypostatically united to the second Person of the Trinity.
However, I do not like this position because it seems to contradict the uniqueness of Christ and the universality of His salvation. Christ is the savior of the cosmos, not only of humanity. He recapitulates in His person all of fallen creation. And as far as Christ's descent from Adam is concerned, the Church has means to respond to this as well. For one, we read in Genesis that Adam and Eve only had three children (Cain, Abel, and Seth), but yet Cain when he is exiled wanders off and encounters other peoples already cropping up. (Thinking about this evolutionarily, Adam and Eve were the first hominids to whom God granted consciousness, but other sentient hominids in their clan soon arose who were not direct biological descendants of these two.) Thus, though Adam and Eve were the first true humans and the ones in whom God chose to 'test' humanity's resolve and faithfulness to Him, a direct biological descent from them is not required for their inclusion in the purview of Christ's saving action. In addition, theological anthropology has often claimed that God's image and likeness is found particularly in the human reasoning faculties (memory, knowledge and will; or mind, love, and knowledge; see Augustine, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130109.htm). Thus, putting these together, an alien race could be redeemed through Christ because they have essentially the same image of God as humanity does, namely a rational mind. This would have the opposite evangelical effect; a whole new missionary field would be opened, and countless other ramifications for theological anthropology would have to be explored.
So much for aliens. On to contraception:
The question was raised as to whether the Church's teaching on contraception is not fundamentally outdated. It seems to imply a certain negative attitude toward human technological progress. However, this standard is not applied consistently. For instance, Catholics may licitly use extraordinary technological means to keep somebody on life support, but we cannot use technological means to regulate birth. It also seems to take a naive approach to human population growth (eg the Church unmitigatedly supports large families and thus reduces the standard of living for people everywhere). Before I answer these questions, I'm going to let a few of the Church's theological presuppositions come to light, which will in turn make sense of the Church's response to these challenges.
First and foremost in the Church's teaching on contraception is the idea that God alone is the ultimate "Author of life." In the Church Fathers, there was some of tension in understanding the origin of the human person. Certainly the building blocks of humanity are passed down from the parents; our 'fleshiness' comes from our parents. However, the origin of the soul was somewhat more contested. Certain fathers believed that the human parents, in addition to the physical form of the human, also contributed the soul to their child. Others, however, believed that God was the one who truly made the fetus human. To create a being destined for eternal glory is a task that God alone is fit and able to perform. Every human individual is a new act of creation on the part of God, somehow participating in the one act of God in creating the first human. The Church has tended to side with the latter argument, and this is especially the case in modern Church documents on the regulation of birth. The first important principle, then, is that God, although in cooperation with human will, is the primary author of human life, for God stamps each and every individual human with His own divine image and likeness.
The next principle is that the human subject is also fully engaged - in body, will, and reason - in marital decisions. This means that the decision to have or not have children is a three-way dialogue between the needs and desires of the husband, wife, and God. It is not a conversation in which God alone can authoritatively speak, as Humanae Vitae spells out:
"With regard to physical, economic, psychological and social conditions, responsible parenthood is exercised by those who prudently and generously decide to have more children, and by those who, for serious reasons and with due respect to moral precepts, decide not to have additional children for either a certain or an indefinite period of time."
Take special note of the latter clauses; within Catholic theology it can indeed be responsible (read: moral) parenting to decide not to have children for "serious reasons and with due respect to moral precepts." Thus, humanity and its needs play a role in this conversation.
The argument of Humanae Vitae is that artificial contraception (almost) completely and intentionally leaves one of these conversation partners out, namely God. Thus, the Church does not oppose contraception as such, but rather only contraception that seeks to ignore God's say in the discussion. NFP (Natural Family Planning), the argument continues, while certainly contraceptive, by necessity requires conversation and discussion of a couple's plans, a discussion which will draw God into the conversation rather than leave Him out. Humanae Vitae acknowledges this:
"It cannot be denied that in [the case of both NFP and artificial contraception] the married couple, for acceptable reasons, are both perfectly clear in their intention to avoid children and wish to make sure that none will result."
Finally, the document states that "The Church... teaches that each and every marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relationship to the procreation of human life." That is, it is not licit to use contraception in some acts, but not others. Within the argument that I have constructed, this is because it is hypocritical to allow God into the conversation in those acts expected to be infertile, but to shut Him out when fertility is expected.
This is my attempt at an exposition of the theological principles at stake in the Catholic position on contraceptives. In addition, however, Humanae Vitae also presents several "slippery slope" arguments for why a 'contraceptive culture' is immoral:
1) "Let them first consider how easily this course of action could open wide the way for marital infidelity and a general lowering of moral standards. Not much experience is needed to be fully aware of human weakness and to understand that human beings—and especially the young, who are so exposed to temptation—need incentives to keep the moral law, and it is an evil thing to make it easy for them to break that law."
2) "Another effect that gives cause for alarm is that a man who grows accustomed to the use of contraceptive methods may forget the reverence due to a woman, and, disregarding her physical and emotional equilibrium, reduce her to being a mere instrument for the satisfaction of his own desires, no longer considering her as his partner whom he should surround with care and affection."
3) "Finally, careful consideration should be given to the danger of this power passing into the hands of those public authorities who care little for the precepts of the moral law. Who will blame a government which in its attempt to resolve the problems affecting an entire country resorts to the same measures as are regarded as lawful by married people in the solution of a particular family difficulty? Who will prevent public authorities from favoring those contraceptive methods which they consider more effective? Should they regard this as necessary, they may even impose their use on everyone. It could well happen, therefore, that when people, either individually or in family or social life, experience the inherent difficulties of the divine law and are determined to avoid them, they may give into the hands of public authorities the power to intervene in the most personal and intimate responsibility of husband and wife.
I need only mention China's oppressive birth-control laws to demonstrate how the third argument has indeed come to fruition. In addition, the Chinese policy has created a strange off-balance in live births; since they are usually only allowed one child, and since men are more desirable in that society (especially in rural areas), extreme measures (including abortion) are used to ensure that that "first" child is a male one. This will have very strange social consequences years from now when there are far more men in the society than women. (Sorry to cite Wikipedia, but look under the headings "Men/Women concern" and "Sex ratio" on this page for more information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China as well as the page on Sex-selective abortion: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sex-selective_abortion)
The document does not deny that there are ways that governments can engage population concerns:
"For there are other ways by which a government can and should solve the population problem—that is to say by enacting laws which will assist families and by educating the people wisely so that the moral law and the freedom of the citizens are both safeguarded."
Also, from Populorum Progressio (promulgated by Pope Paul VI):
"There is no denying that the accelerated rate of population growth brings many added difficulties to the problems of development where the size of the population grows more rapidly than the quantity of available resources to such a degree that things seem to have reached an impasse. In such circumstances people are inclined to apply drastic remedies to reduce the birth rate.
"There is no doubt that public authorities can intervene in this matter, within the bounds of their competence. They can instruct citizens on this subject and adopt appropriate measures, so long as these are in conformity with the dictates of the moral law and the rightful freedom of married couples is preserved completely intact. When the inalienable right of marriage and of procreation is taken away, so is human dignity.
"Finally, it is for parents to take a thorough look at the matter and decide upon the number of their children. This is an obligation they take upon themselves, before their children already born, and before the community to which they belong—following the dictates of their own consciences informed by God's law authentically interpreted, and bolstered by their trust in Him."
Nor is the document intrinsically opposed to the application of human reason to the situation. Reason is a faculty that can be used for either good or ill, and the document explicitly promotes its use for the former:
"It is supremely desirable, and this was also the mind of Pius XII, that medical science should by the study of natural rhythms succeed in determining a sufficiently secure basis for the chaste limitation of offspring."
Is the Church's teaching on contraception irrational? I would say, only for certain values of rationality. Certainly from the standpoint of a non-theistic framework, it could be considered non-sense. Even many of our protestant brothers and sisters find it in some way intellectually offensive. But based on its own theological assumptions about the nature of God and humanity, it seems a rather coherent, well argued position. All of this, however, is far from saying it's an easy position, as many married couples can, I'm sure, attest.
Feel free to push back and ask questions on any of these reflections. It's a long one this week.
After the formal end of our discussion this evening, we hit on a couple interesting, maybe even important, topics. The first of these concerns was brought up by Shane concerning the existence of extraterrestrial life. I, brandishing my twin swords of sci-fi fan-dom and theological interest, have opinions. I have opinions about many things.
The second, on a perhaps more serious note, concerns the status of artificial contraception in the Church, brought up by Brendan. I will address each of these in turn.
First, then, is the issue of aliens; are we alone in the universe? If not, what does that mean theologically? Well with regard to the first question, the Church, to my knowledge, does not make any definitive statements one way or the other. Some might argue that humanity is the unique creation that was made in the image and likeness of God and the only one that God calls "very good," so there can be no other. But I do not find this conclusion to be a necessary position. God has, at least, created other intelligent beings, namely the angels. So in principle, Christianity can tolerate non-human sentient life. And, to quote Jodi Foster, "if it's just us... seems like an awful waste of space." Not that "Contact" hold definitive theological weight. In principle, then, the Church does not definitively rule out the possibility of aliens.
To indulge our imaginations for a moment, then, what happens if there ARE aliens? What happens if we encounter other intelligent, sentient life? What does, or what can, the Church say? I see two possibilities. The first is that the Church would rule that these aliens are not the descendants of Adam, and are therefore not meant to be saved by Christ - a sort of "limited atonement." This position would have support from Scripture in the Adam-Christ typology and from Christological thought in the affirmation of Christ's full "humanity" - note that it's NOT "conscious, sentient, partially material creature." If this position were taken, the Church would effectively rule out evangelization. The Church would say that God has taken to save this other species through a different means than that used for humanity's salvation (and this only assuming that the species was fallen and sinful). If this other species already had a Church or religion with a similar theological structure and with an incarnational God, this would be tricky. Perhaps the Church could make room for the possibility of multiple incarnations - insofar as the domain of these incarnations remains independent and exclusive. That is, both Churches would have to affirm that the Son took the form of their own nature, thus acknowledging that both human flesh and Zorgon exoskeletal-ectoplasm are hypostatically united to the second Person of the Trinity.
However, I do not like this position because it seems to contradict the uniqueness of Christ and the universality of His salvation. Christ is the savior of the cosmos, not only of humanity. He recapitulates in His person all of fallen creation. And as far as Christ's descent from Adam is concerned, the Church has means to respond to this as well. For one, we read in Genesis that Adam and Eve only had three children (Cain, Abel, and Seth), but yet Cain when he is exiled wanders off and encounters other peoples already cropping up. (Thinking about this evolutionarily, Adam and Eve were the first hominids to whom God granted consciousness, but other sentient hominids in their clan soon arose who were not direct biological descendants of these two.) Thus, though Adam and Eve were the first true humans and the ones in whom God chose to 'test' humanity's resolve and faithfulness to Him, a direct biological descent from them is not required for their inclusion in the purview of Christ's saving action. In addition, theological anthropology has often claimed that God's image and likeness is found particularly in the human reasoning faculties (memory, knowledge and will; or mind, love, and knowledge; see Augustine, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130109.htm). Thus, putting these together, an alien race could be redeemed through Christ because they have essentially the same image of God as humanity does, namely a rational mind. This would have the opposite evangelical effect; a whole new missionary field would be opened, and countless other ramifications for theological anthropology would have to be explored.
So much for aliens. On to contraception:
The question was raised as to whether the Church's teaching on contraception is not fundamentally outdated. It seems to imply a certain negative attitude toward human technological progress. However, this standard is not applied consistently. For instance, Catholics may licitly use extraordinary technological means to keep somebody on life support, but we cannot use technological means to regulate birth. It also seems to take a naive approach to human population growth (eg the Church unmitigatedly supports large families and thus reduces the standard of living for people everywhere). Before I answer these questions, I'm going to let a few of the Church's theological presuppositions come to light, which will in turn make sense of the Church's response to these challenges.
First and foremost in the Church's teaching on contraception is the idea that God alone is the ultimate "Author of life." In the Church Fathers, there was some of tension in understanding the origin of the human person. Certainly the building blocks of humanity are passed down from the parents; our 'fleshiness' comes from our parents. However, the origin of the soul was somewhat more contested. Certain fathers believed that the human parents, in addition to the physical form of the human, also contributed the soul to their child. Others, however, believed that God was the one who truly made the fetus human. To create a being destined for eternal glory is a task that God alone is fit and able to perform. Every human individual is a new act of creation on the part of God, somehow participating in the one act of God in creating the first human. The Church has tended to side with the latter argument, and this is especially the case in modern Church documents on the regulation of birth. The first important principle, then, is that God, although in cooperation with human will, is the primary author of human life, for God stamps each and every individual human with His own divine image and likeness.
The next principle is that the human subject is also fully engaged - in body, will, and reason - in marital decisions. This means that the decision to have or not have children is a three-way dialogue between the needs and desires of the husband, wife, and God. It is not a conversation in which God alone can authoritatively speak, as Humanae Vitae spells out:
"With regard to physical, economic, psychological and social conditions, responsible parenthood is exercised by those who prudently and generously decide to have more children, and by those who, for serious reasons and with due respect to moral precepts, decide not to have additional children for either a certain or an indefinite period of time."
Take special note of the latter clauses; within Catholic theology it can indeed be responsible (read: moral) parenting to decide not to have children for "serious reasons and with due respect to moral precepts." Thus, humanity and its needs play a role in this conversation.
The argument of Humanae Vitae is that artificial contraception (almost) completely and intentionally leaves one of these conversation partners out, namely God. Thus, the Church does not oppose contraception as such, but rather only contraception that seeks to ignore God's say in the discussion. NFP (Natural Family Planning), the argument continues, while certainly contraceptive, by necessity requires conversation and discussion of a couple's plans, a discussion which will draw God into the conversation rather than leave Him out. Humanae Vitae acknowledges this:
"It cannot be denied that in [the case of both NFP and artificial contraception] the married couple, for acceptable reasons, are both perfectly clear in their intention to avoid children and wish to make sure that none will result."
Finally, the document states that "The Church... teaches that each and every marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relationship to the procreation of human life." That is, it is not licit to use contraception in some acts, but not others. Within the argument that I have constructed, this is because it is hypocritical to allow God into the conversation in those acts expected to be infertile, but to shut Him out when fertility is expected.
This is my attempt at an exposition of the theological principles at stake in the Catholic position on contraceptives. In addition, however, Humanae Vitae also presents several "slippery slope" arguments for why a 'contraceptive culture' is immoral:
1) "Let them first consider how easily this course of action could open wide the way for marital infidelity and a general lowering of moral standards. Not much experience is needed to be fully aware of human weakness and to understand that human beings—and especially the young, who are so exposed to temptation—need incentives to keep the moral law, and it is an evil thing to make it easy for them to break that law."
2) "Another effect that gives cause for alarm is that a man who grows accustomed to the use of contraceptive methods may forget the reverence due to a woman, and, disregarding her physical and emotional equilibrium, reduce her to being a mere instrument for the satisfaction of his own desires, no longer considering her as his partner whom he should surround with care and affection."
3) "Finally, careful consideration should be given to the danger of this power passing into the hands of those public authorities who care little for the precepts of the moral law. Who will blame a government which in its attempt to resolve the problems affecting an entire country resorts to the same measures as are regarded as lawful by married people in the solution of a particular family difficulty? Who will prevent public authorities from favoring those contraceptive methods which they consider more effective? Should they regard this as necessary, they may even impose their use on everyone. It could well happen, therefore, that when people, either individually or in family or social life, experience the inherent difficulties of the divine law and are determined to avoid them, they may give into the hands of public authorities the power to intervene in the most personal and intimate responsibility of husband and wife.
I need only mention China's oppressive birth-control laws to demonstrate how the third argument has indeed come to fruition. In addition, the Chinese policy has created a strange off-balance in live births; since they are usually only allowed one child, and since men are more desirable in that society (especially in rural areas), extreme measures (including abortion) are used to ensure that that "first" child is a male one. This will have very strange social consequences years from now when there are far more men in the society than women. (Sorry to cite Wikipedia, but look under the headings "Men/Women concern" and "Sex ratio" on this page for more information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China as well as the page on Sex-selective abortion: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sex-selective_abortion)
The document does not deny that there are ways that governments can engage population concerns:
"For there are other ways by which a government can and should solve the population problem—that is to say by enacting laws which will assist families and by educating the people wisely so that the moral law and the freedom of the citizens are both safeguarded."
Also, from Populorum Progressio (promulgated by Pope Paul VI):
"There is no denying that the accelerated rate of population growth brings many added difficulties to the problems of development where the size of the population grows more rapidly than the quantity of available resources to such a degree that things seem to have reached an impasse. In such circumstances people are inclined to apply drastic remedies to reduce the birth rate.
"There is no doubt that public authorities can intervene in this matter, within the bounds of their competence. They can instruct citizens on this subject and adopt appropriate measures, so long as these are in conformity with the dictates of the moral law and the rightful freedom of married couples is preserved completely intact. When the inalienable right of marriage and of procreation is taken away, so is human dignity.
"Finally, it is for parents to take a thorough look at the matter and decide upon the number of their children. This is an obligation they take upon themselves, before their children already born, and before the community to which they belong—following the dictates of their own consciences informed by God's law authentically interpreted, and bolstered by their trust in Him."
Nor is the document intrinsically opposed to the application of human reason to the situation. Reason is a faculty that can be used for either good or ill, and the document explicitly promotes its use for the former:
"It is supremely desirable, and this was also the mind of Pius XII, that medical science should by the study of natural rhythms succeed in determining a sufficiently secure basis for the chaste limitation of offspring."
Is the Church's teaching on contraception irrational? I would say, only for certain values of rationality. Certainly from the standpoint of a non-theistic framework, it could be considered non-sense. Even many of our protestant brothers and sisters find it in some way intellectually offensive. But based on its own theological assumptions about the nature of God and humanity, it seems a rather coherent, well argued position. All of this, however, is far from saying it's an easy position, as many married couples can, I'm sure, attest.
Feel free to push back and ask questions on any of these reflections. It's a long one this week.
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
The Fall
Tonight we grappled with one of the more difficult doctrines in Christian belief: the Fall. It is based out of the text of Genesis 1-3, where God creates Adam and Eve, our biological forebears, who promptly get themselves in trouble. As a preliminary note, Judaism, or at least large swaths of it, do not read this passage as implying anything of a radical Fall that affects all humanity; it was merely an individual breach of covenant, from which the people of God would eventually recover through later covenants.
St. Paul was the first to articulate the doctrine of original sin in his epistles, where he acts almost as a rabbi within Judaism would, reinterpreting the traditions in light of the new covenant he believed to have been revealed through Christ. He states in Romans that:
"Through one person sin entered the world, and through sin, death, and thus death came to all, inasmuch as all sinned."
And in 1 Corinthians, he claims "For just as in Adam all die, so too in Christ shall all be brought to life."
Paul somehow sums up human sin in its very first instance, uniting us in sin to make sense of the solution that Paul sees in Christ. This is later explained by Augustine, who believes that we were all, as a race, present in Adam and in some way accented to his decision. He also goes into graphic detail (see paragraph 36 of http://newadvent.org/fathers/15012.htm and paragraph 20 of http://newadvent.org/fathers/15072.htm ) about how it is that original sin is transmitted; it is nothing short of a genetic disease passed down through the seed of the man in intercourse.
Though it might not make sense today to say that in the instant Adam and Eve sinned, their DNA was restructured from "unfallen" to "fallen," the import of his argument remains important for Christians to maintain. We are all guilty and participate in sin, even before we are able to give an "adult" assent to it. Social sin is, perhaps, related to original sin, but they are distinct and should not be identified. Original is not what is called "actual sin," that is, a sin that an individual personally commits AND for which one is considered culpable. Original sin does imply personal culpability, but it is not a sin that we personally commit; Adam commits it personally, and its guilt is mysteriously (read: I can't explain it any better) attributed to us.
On the topic of the felix culpa, I don't want to grant it unnecessary weight, because it doesn't play that big of a role in the actual life of the Church. It has speculative ramifications, however, that we touched on in class. If one believes (as I tend to) that Christ would have come even if humanity had not sinned (and that is something we can get into later if you'd like), then it is not indeed the case that sin "earned" us anything or anyone, because we still would have had come to have Christ (I just invented a new tense) otherwise. As far as I know, the position that Christ would have come without sin is not something condemned by the Church, and as such, the felix culpa does not follow as a necessary position.
Also, as I said, the felix implies a certain relationship between good and evil that I have problems with. Certainly, God can bring good from evil; this I do not dispute. But to say that God did not intend for us to have just as full an existence with him before sin as God intended for us after sin, this seems to imply that God hadn't planned well enough the first time (It also seems to imply that Eden was the best humanity would have had without sin, which I think is also disputable.) The nature of the Good (contrary to how many philosophers would define it) is such that it is self-sufficient, not needing its opposite to exist in its fullness. To believe that the Good can eventually be improved by contamination with evil seems contrary to this definition. I am inclined to think that the Good God wished for humanity was the same regardless of human sin, and that sin just changed the terms by which this end would be attained. Sin did not improve the Good, because if Good needs evil, then it is not Good.
HOWEVER: assuming for a moment that Christ would NOT have come without sin, then the felix culpa holds in some sense; it is indeed a good that humanity have Christ, and if sin was the only way we would have him, then sin has given us a good we would not have otherwise had. In undergrad this was put to me in the following thought experiment. Suppose there is a married couple, Pat and Sam (call whichever one you like the husband), who have all the happiness they could ever hope for; their marriage is wonderful, they have beautiful children, everything is rosy. However: one day, Pat suddenly cheats on Sam! Things have been destroyed, their marriage seems to have been ruined, and both are devastated. But then, Sam, out of the graciousness of his/her heart, forgives Pat and accepts his/her spouse back. Do not Pat and Sam have a good that they did not have before, namely the knowledge that their love can overcome the circumstances of adultery? Or can this knowledge remain implicit in a relationship and still be just as real? If the former can be coherently argued (and I think it can), the felix culpa has something to be said for it.
We have finished the First Article of the Creed! We're on our way to Jesus, finally!
St. Paul was the first to articulate the doctrine of original sin in his epistles, where he acts almost as a rabbi within Judaism would, reinterpreting the traditions in light of the new covenant he believed to have been revealed through Christ. He states in Romans that:
"Through one person sin entered the world, and through sin, death, and thus death came to all, inasmuch as all sinned."
And in 1 Corinthians, he claims "For just as in Adam all die, so too in Christ shall all be brought to life."
Paul somehow sums up human sin in its very first instance, uniting us in sin to make sense of the solution that Paul sees in Christ. This is later explained by Augustine, who believes that we were all, as a race, present in Adam and in some way accented to his decision. He also goes into graphic detail (see paragraph 36 of http://newadvent.org/fathers/15012.htm and paragraph 20 of http://newadvent.org/fathers/15072.htm ) about how it is that original sin is transmitted; it is nothing short of a genetic disease passed down through the seed of the man in intercourse.
Though it might not make sense today to say that in the instant Adam and Eve sinned, their DNA was restructured from "unfallen" to "fallen," the import of his argument remains important for Christians to maintain. We are all guilty and participate in sin, even before we are able to give an "adult" assent to it. Social sin is, perhaps, related to original sin, but they are distinct and should not be identified. Original is not what is called "actual sin," that is, a sin that an individual personally commits AND for which one is considered culpable. Original sin does imply personal culpability, but it is not a sin that we personally commit; Adam commits it personally, and its guilt is mysteriously (read: I can't explain it any better) attributed to us.
On the topic of the felix culpa, I don't want to grant it unnecessary weight, because it doesn't play that big of a role in the actual life of the Church. It has speculative ramifications, however, that we touched on in class. If one believes (as I tend to) that Christ would have come even if humanity had not sinned (and that is something we can get into later if you'd like), then it is not indeed the case that sin "earned" us anything or anyone, because we still would have had come to have Christ (I just invented a new tense) otherwise. As far as I know, the position that Christ would have come without sin is not something condemned by the Church, and as such, the felix culpa does not follow as a necessary position.
Also, as I said, the felix implies a certain relationship between good and evil that I have problems with. Certainly, God can bring good from evil; this I do not dispute. But to say that God did not intend for us to have just as full an existence with him before sin as God intended for us after sin, this seems to imply that God hadn't planned well enough the first time (It also seems to imply that Eden was the best humanity would have had without sin, which I think is also disputable.) The nature of the Good (contrary to how many philosophers would define it) is such that it is self-sufficient, not needing its opposite to exist in its fullness. To believe that the Good can eventually be improved by contamination with evil seems contrary to this definition. I am inclined to think that the Good God wished for humanity was the same regardless of human sin, and that sin just changed the terms by which this end would be attained. Sin did not improve the Good, because if Good needs evil, then it is not Good.
HOWEVER: assuming for a moment that Christ would NOT have come without sin, then the felix culpa holds in some sense; it is indeed a good that humanity have Christ, and if sin was the only way we would have him, then sin has given us a good we would not have otherwise had. In undergrad this was put to me in the following thought experiment. Suppose there is a married couple, Pat and Sam (call whichever one you like the husband), who have all the happiness they could ever hope for; their marriage is wonderful, they have beautiful children, everything is rosy. However: one day, Pat suddenly cheats on Sam! Things have been destroyed, their marriage seems to have been ruined, and both are devastated. But then, Sam, out of the graciousness of his/her heart, forgives Pat and accepts his/her spouse back. Do not Pat and Sam have a good that they did not have before, namely the knowledge that their love can overcome the circumstances of adultery? Or can this knowledge remain implicit in a relationship and still be just as real? If the former can be coherently argued (and I think it can), the felix culpa has something to be said for it.
We have finished the First Article of the Creed! We're on our way to Jesus, finally!
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Christology
So why does Christology matter?
That was the question that perhaps struck me the most from our meeting of Nov. 3. As someone who is in the process of trying to make a living of Christology, I guess I just took it for granted that it does matter. I hope to answer this question by the end, but I'm going to start with a quick summary of the Christological content of the first four councils.
Niceae: 325, defined Christ as homoousia with the Father, affirming the Son's full divinity.
Constantinople: 381, rejected Apollinaris who denied that Christ had a human mind.
Ephesus: 431, rejected Nestorius, who said there were two persons, a human person and a divine person, in Jesus Christ
Chalcedon: 451, rejected the monophysites who said there was only one nature in Jesus Christ.
The early Church was almost obsessed with getting its understanding of Jesus Christ down correctly. They had many reasons for doing so, not the least of which had to do with the legalization of Christianity under the reign of Constantine. But it had its motivation from within Christianity's theology and practical life, as well. Without a proper understanding of Christ, the nature and legitimacy of Christian worship easily becomes incoherent. If Christ is not truly God (as the Arians claimed) then Christians cannot justify their worship of a mere creature. If Christ is not fully man (as Apollinarius held) then Christians do not have a redeemer who is able "to sympathize with our weaknesses" (Hebrews 4:15), since he did not understand them completely. If Christ was not a single person (as Nestorius said), the unity of Christ is called into question, and so is his body, the Church. If Christ does not have two complete natures (as the monophysites claimed), then Christ is neither fully human nor fully divine, but some conglomeration and confusion of the two. Thus, the full Chalcedonian definition contains elements of all these coucils:
Therefore, following the holy fathers, we all with one accord teach men to acknowledge one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once complete in Godhead and complete in manhood, truly God and truly man, consisting also of a reasonable soul and body; of one substance with the Father as regards his Godhead, and at the same time of one substance with us as regards his manhood; like us in all respects, apart from sin; as regards his Godhead, begotten of the Father before the ages, but yet as regards his manhood begotten, for us men and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin, the God-bearer; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, recognized in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ; even as the prophets from earliest times spoke of him, and our Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us, and the creed of the fathers has handed down to us.
Christology matters to me because it is here more than anywhere else in theology that we come to understand Christ and hopefully thereby to know him. We are confronted with one of, if not the central, mystery of the Christian faith: the mystery of God incarnate, quite literally made flesh, made meat. Though the terminology may be cumbersome at times, the councils of the early centuries struggled to bring to light the fact that Christ is in fact like us in all things, yet without sin. He is human, without ceasing to be God. Christology is the working out and explication of the very condescension of God and the very salvation of humanity. The maintenance of this stance has required protracted and (perhaps) obscure philosophizing, but the results are definitive and require our assent. Though the councils do not exhaust the mystery, we must take our stance with them over against those who would pervert Christian doctrine (whoever they might be). We stand with the council fathers over against Arius, Apollinaris, Nestorius, and the monophysites (modern ecumenical dialogue aside) because we believe that these heresiarchs somehow managed to compromise the mystery of Christ in such a way that fundamentally calls into question what the faithful believe Christ to have done and accomplished. And this is something that I think all Christians should care about because it impacts directly on what Christ is said to do and have done for each of us.
But why does Christology matter to you? Does any of this strike you existentially, so to speak? I am convinced that Christology matters, but perhaps I will have to do some more explanation to make it matter to everyone in the group... not that you all have to love it as much as I do.
That was the question that perhaps struck me the most from our meeting of Nov. 3. As someone who is in the process of trying to make a living of Christology, I guess I just took it for granted that it does matter. I hope to answer this question by the end, but I'm going to start with a quick summary of the Christological content of the first four councils.
Niceae: 325, defined Christ as homoousia with the Father, affirming the Son's full divinity.
Constantinople: 381, rejected Apollinaris who denied that Christ had a human mind.
Ephesus: 431, rejected Nestorius, who said there were two persons, a human person and a divine person, in Jesus Christ
Chalcedon: 451, rejected the monophysites who said there was only one nature in Jesus Christ.
The early Church was almost obsessed with getting its understanding of Jesus Christ down correctly. They had many reasons for doing so, not the least of which had to do with the legalization of Christianity under the reign of Constantine. But it had its motivation from within Christianity's theology and practical life, as well. Without a proper understanding of Christ, the nature and legitimacy of Christian worship easily becomes incoherent. If Christ is not truly God (as the Arians claimed) then Christians cannot justify their worship of a mere creature. If Christ is not fully man (as Apollinarius held) then Christians do not have a redeemer who is able "to sympathize with our weaknesses" (Hebrews 4:15), since he did not understand them completely. If Christ was not a single person (as Nestorius said), the unity of Christ is called into question, and so is his body, the Church. If Christ does not have two complete natures (as the monophysites claimed), then Christ is neither fully human nor fully divine, but some conglomeration and confusion of the two. Thus, the full Chalcedonian definition contains elements of all these coucils:
Therefore, following the holy fathers, we all with one accord teach men to acknowledge one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once complete in Godhead and complete in manhood, truly God and truly man, consisting also of a reasonable soul and body; of one substance with the Father as regards his Godhead, and at the same time of one substance with us as regards his manhood; like us in all respects, apart from sin; as regards his Godhead, begotten of the Father before the ages, but yet as regards his manhood begotten, for us men and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin, the God-bearer; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, recognized in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ; even as the prophets from earliest times spoke of him, and our Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us, and the creed of the fathers has handed down to us.
Christology matters to me because it is here more than anywhere else in theology that we come to understand Christ and hopefully thereby to know him. We are confronted with one of, if not the central, mystery of the Christian faith: the mystery of God incarnate, quite literally made flesh, made meat. Though the terminology may be cumbersome at times, the councils of the early centuries struggled to bring to light the fact that Christ is in fact like us in all things, yet without sin. He is human, without ceasing to be God. Christology is the working out and explication of the very condescension of God and the very salvation of humanity. The maintenance of this stance has required protracted and (perhaps) obscure philosophizing, but the results are definitive and require our assent. Though the councils do not exhaust the mystery, we must take our stance with them over against those who would pervert Christian doctrine (whoever they might be). We stand with the council fathers over against Arius, Apollinaris, Nestorius, and the monophysites (modern ecumenical dialogue aside) because we believe that these heresiarchs somehow managed to compromise the mystery of Christ in such a way that fundamentally calls into question what the faithful believe Christ to have done and accomplished. And this is something that I think all Christians should care about because it impacts directly on what Christ is said to do and have done for each of us.
But why does Christology matter to you? Does any of this strike you existentially, so to speak? I am convinced that Christology matters, but perhaps I will have to do some more explanation to make it matter to everyone in the group... not that you all have to love it as much as I do.
This Blog
Hello, Aquini! I decided to start a blog for our little RCIA group! I saw that a past RCIA leader had done something similar, so, despite my lack of knowledge of these sorts of enterprises, I thought it worth a shot. The purpose will be to summarize lessons and discussions, on my end, but also to give you all a place to post comments and questions that can be bounced around here, or when we get together on Tuesdays. I will hopefully post another entry tonight on our Christology conversation last Tuesday, which I found very productive and exciting.
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